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RECENT CASE NOTES
it is clear that the legislative intent was to grant a uniform remedy to all
beneficiaries whose rights under a fiduciary or trust relationship had been
breached by a bank or trust company. Formerly, as seen by the majority
rule which has been the law in Indiana, the remedy offered a beneficiary
against a commingling trustee depended upon the beneficiary's ability to trace
the trust res or its proceeds into a certain asset of the trustee. Under the
principal decision the beneficiary's remedy against the commingling trustee
will no longer waver between a general or preferred claim according to the
beneficiary's ability so to trace. The present Indiana rule, as set out in the
principal case may then be stated as follows: All beneficiaries entitled to unin-
vested funds in the hands of a bank or trust company acting as a trustee,
which funds have been commingled with the funds of the trustee, have
upon the insolvency of said trustee, a preferred claim against all the assets
of such trustee.
The granting of a preferred claim over all the assets of a commingling
trustee to the beneficiary of a trust has been accomplished in certain in-
stances without the provisions of a statute. One of such instances is where
the insolvent trustee held funds for the benefit of the state. In such cases,
if the commingled fund does not equal the amount of the state's claim against
such trustee, the' state obtains a preference over all the trustee's assets. 10
Under Chapter 167 of the Indiana Acts of 1931, any beneficiary under similar
circumstances, is now afforded the remedy once open only to the state. Here,
the court was clearly correct in granting preference to the appellant's claim,
for the statute obviously contemplates a new and more certain remedy for
all beneficiaries who have claims against insolvent banks and trust companies.
R.A.B.
Constitutional Law--Eminent Domain-Public Use.-Action for appoint-
ment of appraisers of land for railroad connection. Both parties are corpo-
rations engaged in the business of operating stone quarries. Defendant con-
tends that the statute which gives stone quarries the power of eminent domain
for the purpose of constructing a lateral railroad for not more than ten
miles in length to any other railroad or canal is unconstitutional because the
property was to be taken for a private and not a public use. Held, the
development and operation of mines and quarries is of such public interest
and benefit to the state and to the communities in which they are situated
that mining and quarrying may properly be regarded as a public use for
which the power of eminent domain may be delegated for the purpose of
securing a way of necessity. Judgment for plaintiff reversed because the act
in question did not enable the plaintiff to acquire defendant's completed
lateral railroad, which was included in the proposed appropriation.'
No principle of law is better settled than that the legislature can not
grant to a private corporation or individual the power to take private property
for a private use, but it is equally'well settled that the legislature may grant
fiduciary that may be appointed, shall have preference and priority in all assets of
such bank or trust company over its general creditors, for all uninvested money held
by such bank or trust company in its capacity as a fiduciary, to the extent that such
money is commingled with its general assets, or is not duly accounted for."
?Wooley Coal Co. v. Trevault (1918), 187 Ind. 171, 118 N. E. 921; State v. Shanks(1912), 178 Ind. 330, 99 N. E. 481; State v. Jennings (1872), 27 Ark. 419.
10 State v. Bruce (1909), 17 Idaho 1, 102 Pac. 831; Meyer v. Board of Education
(1893), 51 Kan. 87, 32 Pac. 658.
lIndianapolis Oolitic Stone Co. v. Alexander King Stone Co. (1934), 190 N.,-E.
57 (Ind.).
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the power of eminent domain to a private individual or corporation when
the property taken under the grant of that power is for a public use.
2
Although a presumption exists in favor of the public character of the use
declared by the legislature to be public, this presumption is not conclusive,
and whether a particular use is public or private is a judicial question and
must be ultimately decided by the courts.3
The decisions of the courts in the United States in determining what
constitutes a public use, however, show a distinct split of authority.4 Many
jurisdictions have adopted the rule that to make a use public in the sense
in which it is used in this connection, the general public have the right to a
definite and fixed use of the property appropriated. 5 Courts adopting this
view do not insist, however, that all the public have the right to use the ap-
propriated property, but state that the requirements of a public use are satis-
fied if a portion of the public has that right. 6 Other jurisdictions have
applied the test of public benefit or public advantage to determine whether
or not the use in question is a public use.7 This view is manifestly more
liberal, as public benefit or advantage may be found in many instances where
the public would most certainly not have the right to use the property ap-
propriated. Statutes which have granted the power of eminent domain to an
individual or a corporation for the purpose of obtaining water for land,8
or for mining, 9 to a mining company for the purpose of constructing a
tramway, 10 to a lumber company for the purpose of building a railway,"
have been upheld as constituting a grant of power for a public use on the
2Waterworks Co. of Indianapolis v. Burkhart (1872), 41 Ind. 364; Wild v. Deig
(1873), 43 Ind. 455; Stewart v. Hartman (1874), 46 Ind. 331; Blackman v. Halves(1880), 72 Ind. 515; Gaylord v. Sanitary District of Chicago (1903), 204 Ill. 574,
68 N. E. 522; Minneapolis General Electric Co. v. Minneapolis (1911), 194 F. 215;
Gillette v. Aurora Ry. Co. (1907), 228 Ill. 261, 81 N. E. 1005; Salisbury Land and
Improvement Co. v. Commonwealth (1913), 215 Mass. 603, 102 N. E. 619; Opinion
of Justices (1911), 208 Mass. 603, 94 N. E. 848; Gilman v. Tucker (1891), 128 N. Y.
190, 28 N. E. 1040; Long Sault Development Co. v. Kennedy (1914), 212 N. Y. 1,
105 N. E. 849.
3 Waterworks Co. of Indianapolis v. Burkhart (1872), 41 Ind. 364; Sexauer v.
Star Milling Co. (1909), 173 Ind. 342, 90 N. E. 474; Mull v. Indianapolis, etc. Traction
Co. (1907), 169 Ind. 214, 81 N. E. 657; Westport Stone Co. v. Thomas (1910), 175
Ind. 319, 94 N. E. 406; Walker v. Shasta Power Co. (1908), 160 F. 856; Talbot v.
Hudson (1860), 16 Gray 417; Long Sault Development Company v. Kennedy (1914),
212 N. Y. 1, 105 N. E. 849.
4 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (8th ed.), p. 766.
5 Ross v. Davis (1884), 97 Ind. 79; Sexauer v. Star Milling Co. (1909), 173 Ind.
342, 90 N. E. 474; Mull v. Indianapolis, etc., Traction Co. (1907), 169 Ind. 214, 81
N. E. 657; Ozark Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania Anthracite Railroad Co. (1911), 97 Ark.
495, 134 S. W. 634; Chesapeake Stone Co. v. Moreland (1907), 126 Ky. 656, 104 S. W.
762; Cozad v. Kanawha Hardwood Co. (1905), 139 N. C. 283, 51 S. E. 932; Sholl v.
German Coal Co. (1887), 118 Ill. 427, 10 N. E. 199, 54 A. L. R. 7.
6 Sexauer v. Star Milling Co. (1909), 173 Ind. 342, 90 N. E. 474; Mull v.
Indianapolis, etc., Traction Co. (1907), 169 Ind. 214, 81 N. E. 657; Bedford Quarries
Co. v. Chicago and Louisville Ry. (1910), 175 Ind. 304, 94 N. E. 326; Chesapeake
Stone Co. v. Moreland (1907), 126 Ky. 656, 104 S. W. 762; Talbot v. Hudson (1860),
16 Gray 417.
7 Clark v. Nash (1904), 27 Utah 158, 75 P. 371, affirmed (1905), 198 U. S. 361,
49 L. Ed. 1085; Blackwell Lumber Co. v. Empire Mill Co. (1916), 28 Idaho 556, 155
P. 680; Hand Gold Mining Co. v. Parker (1877), 59 Ga. 419; New Central Coal Co.
v. George's Creek Coal and Iron Co. (1872), 37 Md. 537; Oury v. Goodwin (1891),
3 Ariz. 255, 26 P. 376; Long Sault Development Co. v. Kennedy (1914), 143 N. Y. S.
454, 105 N. E. 849; Hazen v. Essex Co. (1853), 12 Cush. 475; Talbott v. Hudson
(1860), 16 Gray 417; Douglas v. Byrnes (1893), 59 F. 29, 54 A. L. R. 7.
8 Clark v. Nash (1904), 27 Utah 158, 75 P. 371, affirmed (1905), 198 U. S. 361,
49 L. ed. 1085.
9 Hand Gold Mining Co. v. Parker (1887), 59 Ga. 419.
10 Strickley v. Highland Boy Mining Co. (1905), 200 U. S. 527, 50 L. ed. 581.
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ground that there was a sufficient public benefit in the development of
natural resources. Under either test it seems that the mere fact that the
individual or corporation to whom the power is granted will receive personal
gain or benefit will not prevent the use from being public, if the other re-
quirements are met. 12
Until the decision in the principal case, it seems to have been the settled
rule in Indiana that the test to be applied to determine whether or not a
use was public was whether the public had the right to use the property
appropriated.' 3 In Westport Stone Company v. Thomas,' 4 the Indiana
Supreme Court applied this test in upholding the constitutionality of the
statute, the validity of which is in question in the principal case.1 5 This
reason was disapproved, however, by the court in this case, the court saying:
"We are convinced, however, that the act does not invest the owner of a
quarry or mine with the character of a common carrier or with the duties
and privileges of a common carrier. We think that the validity of the grant
of power of eminent domain must rest upon the ground that the state has
such an interest in the development of its natural resources that the General
Assembly can treat the business of mining or quarrying as a 'public use.'"
Although the'Indiana court does not expressly repudiate the test formerly
applied in this state, it would seem that it has in fact followed Clark v.
Nash' 0 in adopting public benefit as the criterion of public use. If the
statute in question is to be upheld at all, it must be on this ground for it is
obvious that the criticism directed at Westport Stone Company v. Thomas
was just. The correctness of the result in the principal case, then, depends
upon whether the court was right in finding that the business of quarrying
was vested with a public interest. This is a question of policy to be deter-
mined by the state court, because, as set out by the United States Supreme
Court in Clark v. Nash, "The local courts understand the situation which led
to the demand for the enactment of the statute, and they also appreciate the
results upon the growth and prosperity of the state, which in all probability
would flow from the denial of its validity."'17 It is here submitted that the
Supreme Court of Indiana, while doubtlessly adopting a more liberal view
than formerly expressed judicially in this state, followed in the principal
case a view which has been shown to be preferable by eminent authority.
C. L. C.
Courts-Number of Jurors Required.-Appellee filed its claim in the
City Court of East Chicago asking for damages in the sum of $600. The
only errors presented involved the jurisdiction of the court and the over-
ruling of appellant's motion for a new trial. Appellant asserts that the
City Court of East Chicago had no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of
the action, and that, therefore, the Lake Circuit Court, upon appeal, did
"1 Blackwell Lumber Co. v. Empire Mill Co. (1916), 28 Idaho 556, 155 P. 680.
12Mull v. Indianapolis, etc., Traction Co. (1907), 169 Ind. 214, 81 N. E. 657;
Burley v. United States (1910), 179 F. 1; Hairston v. Danville and Western Ry. Co.(1908), 208 U. S. 598, 52 L. ed. 637; City of Santa Ana v. Harlin (1893), 99 Cal.
538, 34 P. 224; Chicago, B. and Q. Railroad Co. v. City of Napei-ville (1897), 169 Il1.
25, 48 N. E. 335.
13 Sexauer v. Star Milling Co. (1909), 173 Ind. 342, 90 N. E. 474; Mull v.
Indianapolis, etc., Traction Co. (1907), 169 Ind. 214, 81 N. E. 657; Bedford Quarries
Company v. Chicago, Indianapolis and Louisville Ry. Co. (1910), 175 Ind. 353, 94
N. E. 326; Westport Stone Co. v. Thomas (1910), 175 Ind. 319, 94 N. E. 406.
14 (1910), 175 Ind. 319, 94 N. E. 406.
15 Burns' Ann. St. 1926, Sec. 13218.
16 (1904), 27 Utah 158, 75 P. 371, affirmed (1905), 198 U. S. 361, 49 L. ed. 1085.
'7 (1905), 198 U. S. 361, 49 L. ed. 1085.
